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Grounded theory (in some form or other) is a standard method of social science 
research and widely accepted as valid by researchers, university teachers and 
authorities in this field. As Bryant and Charmaz (2010: 1) confirm, the method „...is 
currently the most widely used and popular qualitative research method across a wide 
range of disciplines and subject areas‟. They further claim that its extensive use in 
„specific practice professions‟ has led to „significant advances‟ in those fields and that „it 
is clearly “a good thing”‟ (ibid). This paper examines grounded theory in terms of this 
contrast between the inductive approach it espouses and the hypothetico-deductive 
method, typified by Popper (in for example Popper (1992)), which is the basis of CIS‟s 
work. The paper draws heavily on my review of The Sage Handbook of Grounded 
Theory edited by Bryant and Charmaz (2010), published in Higher Education Review 
(Pratt, 2011). 
 
The method was first put forward just over 40 years ago by Barney G Glaser and 
Anselm L Strauss (1967) in The Discovery of Grounded Theory, though the authors 
have developed the ideas (sometimes significantly differently from one another) in later 
publications. It „comprises a systematic, inductive, and comparative approach for 
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conducting inquiry for the purpose of constructing theory‟ (ibid). It encourages 
„researchers‟ persistent interaction with their data, while remaining constantly involved 
with their emerging analysis‟ (ibid). Glaser and Strauss saw grounded theory as 
opposed to „the traditional method of deriving theory and testing hypotheses from 
existing theory‟ (Bryant and Charmaz, 2010: 172).  They „were always keen to 
demonstrate that their method was inductive as opposed to the conventional deductive 
approaches they were challenging‟ (op cit: 44). 
 
The problems with grounded theory emerge almost immediately. The very term can, as 
Bryant and Charmaz (2010: 2) note, „lead to confusion‟. In some cases, it refers to the 
result of a research process that is a (grounded) theory, resulting from the use of the 
grounded theory method (GTM) – the latter being the other (more commonplace) sense 
in which the term is widely used, (and it is the method that is discussed here).  
 
What is often striking about the approach, as Bryant (2010: xxviii) says, is that it appears 
that those who employ it embark on their research without a clear research aim or plan 
of action. One authority argues that the researcher should enter their domain without a 
„pre-conceived problem statement, interview protocols or extensive review of literature‟ 
(cited in Bryant and Charmaz, 2010: 20). (It is clear that many students‟ research 
proposals claiming to use GTM do not conform to this requirement – indeed cannot 
because they would be unlikely to pass through research degree committees). However, 
this illustrates some of the distinctiveness of the method. It draws attention to its 
inductive nature. Theory is developed iteratively and inductively from data.  
 
Glaser and Strauss described the components of this process in their 1967 text 
(summarised by Hood, 2010: 154) as a „spiral of cycles of data collection, coding, 
analysis, writing design, theoretical categorization, and data collection‟. There is 
„constant comparative analysis of cases with each other and to theoretical categories 
through each cycle‟ and a „theoretical sampling process based upon categories derived 
from ongoing data analysis‟. This iterative and constantly back-and-forth process 
proceeds until „theoretical saturation‟ of categories is achieved, so that sample size is 
determined by this rather than by demographic representativeness. 
 
The grounded theory method is intended to offer significant benefits over others. The 
advantages claimed for it are summarised by Dey (2010: 172):  „In place of the 
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traditional method of deriving theory and testing hypotheses from existing theory they 
[Glaser and Strauss] emphasized the virtue of generating theory through interaction with 
data‟. This theory, Glaser and Strauss claimed, „could be more relevant and productive 
since it would at least fit the immediate problems being investigated, as well as opening 
up more fruitful lines of enquiry‟. Such theory „was not speculative since it derived 
directly from empirical observation...‟(ibid).  
 
However, these advantages are not as clear or substantial as they seem. The 
philosophical or logical basis for GTM, despite some firm statements by various authors 
in Bryant and Charmaz (2010), and Glaser and Strauss themselves, is flawed – as 
indeed some of its protagonists admit. Bryant and Charmaz (2010: 1, 15) emphasise 
that „Glaser and Strauss were always keen to demonstrate that their method was 
inductive as opposed to the conventional deductive approaches they were challenging‟ 
(op cit: 44). (The claim about the conventionality of deductive approaches seems odd, 
especially for the 1960s when they had far from wide acceptance, but never mind).  Yet 
Bryant and Charmaz (op cit: 45) note the major problem of induction that „merely 
because one has collected a limitless number of seemingly identical observations, one 
has no certainty that generalizing from these observations produces a valid conclusion‟.  
This problem was expounded as long ago as the 18th century by Hume - and resolved 
by Popper in the 1930s. (A good account of this can be found in Swann (2003: 14-22)). 
Popper showed that (scientific) knowledge advanced not by induction as was then 
widely thought (see Medawar 1969: 22) but by a process of conjecture and refutation –a 
method of trial and error. Popper summarised the process in the following schema: 
 
P1 -> TT(TS) -> EE -> P2 
 
in which P1 represents an initial problem, TT(TS) a tentative theory (solution), EE a 
process of error elimination and P2 the new problem arising at the end of the process. 
 
The problem can be a theoretical (eg why do things do that?) or practical one (eg how 
do we get this done?) - or even for the fans of grounded theory one arising from existing 
data (such as, is there a pattern here?). To this problem tentative solutions or theories 
are offered; these are then tested (by data, evidence, experiment etc) and fallacious 
ones are rejected. A solution or theory that stands the test is however always provisional 
(and always presents new problems, though with luck lesser ones). Popper‟s 
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explanation of the logic of scientific discovery is now broadly accepted, but Glaser and 
Strauss (like many of their time and since) carried on as if nothing had happened with, 
as Bryant and Charmaz acknowledge, „no reference to the body of arguments about the 
problems of induction‟ (2010: 45). The problem of induction - and the relationship 
between the data and the emergent theories -  is also explicitly acknowledged by 
Reichertz (2010: 214-15): „The incorrectness of such an inductive approach has already 
been proven...‟ (and she cites amongst others Popper). 
 
So why is it so popular? One reason is that the invention of grounded theory had a 
significant psychological element. Glaser and Strauss were explicitly seeking a method 
to give assurance and security about method to practitioners in the social sciences. The 
GT method sought to „produce outcomes of equal significance to those produced by the 
predominant statistical-quantitative, primarily mass survey methods of the day‟ (Bryant 
and Charmaz (2010: 33). Glaser and Strauss „aimed to provide a clear basis for 
systematic qualitative research...‟ (ibid). (Glaser argued that the method applied equally 
to quantitative inquiry).  In the 1960s, claim Bryant and Charmaz (2010: 35), qualitative 
research „was clearly seen as second rate‟ and Glaser and Strauss sought „some basis 
of validity equal to that of quantitative practices‟ and so were trying „to establish a 
“scientific” basis‟ for qualitative research. As Dey (2010:172) states: „When Glaser and 
Strauss wrote the Discovery of Grounded Theory they wanted to challenge grandiose 
armchair theorizing‟. The felt need for security is evident from the style of the original 
1967 text. Strauss and Corbin later noted that its purpose was „partly rhetorical‟, which 
goes some way to explain a style which almost certainly would not today be accepted as 
of the quality needed for international recognition by assessors of research excellence.  
 
The search for psychological security on which grounded theory arises is not just from 
comparisons with the quantitative methods of the day. It also had an element of the 
search for certainty in knowledge that characterises much writing about the social (and 
natural) sciences. As Swann (2011, forthcoming) puts it: „to a large extent the history of 
science ... can be viewed as the search for certainties or secure knowledge‟. There is no 
certain knowledge. Induction does not produce anything other than patterns and no 
amount of confirming data „verify‟ a theory. But there is tested theory and the function of 




The way that grounded theory offered psychological security was through procedure - by 
the generation of theory through interaction with data. Thus the most visible 
characteristic of the grounded theory method is the elaborate set of procedures for this 
interaction (Hood, 2010: 154):  a „spiral of cycles of data collection, coding, analysis, 
writing design, theoretical categorization, and data collection‟. One of the advantages 
claimed for grounded theory as Dey (2010: 185) puts it is that „it offers practical advice 
about the nuts and bolts of doing qualitative research‟ - not least „when to stop‟. 
Theoretical saturation means, he says, „stop when the ideas run out‟, or as Glaser and 
Strauss said originally, when „no additional data are being found whereby the [analyst] 
can develop the properties of the category‟ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 61).  
 
This notion of theoretical saturation relates to a key feature of grounded theory: it is 
generation of theory that was Glaser‟s and Strauss‟s original concern of grounded 
theory. Unlike the hypothetico-deductive method of Popper (and indeed differing also 
from the methods of inductivists who usually seek to „verify‟ data by further observations) 
the grounded theory method as propounded by Glaser and Strauss stops short at the 
point of either testing or verifying theory. As Glaser and Strauss put it, „...the constant 
comparative method cannot be used for both provisional testing and discovering 
theory...the data collected are not extensive enough, and because of theoretical 
saturation, are not coded extensively enough to yield provisional tests...They are coded 
only to generate, hence to suggest, theory‟(Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 103).  
 
„Generation‟ of theory was seen by Glaser and Strauss as opposed to „verification‟ -  
which appears to be their understanding of the key feature of the processes of the 
natural sciences they sought to emulate, and which is a characteristic of induction. This 
concern is further revealed in Dey‟s statement (2010: 186) that: „Theoretical 
sampling...is considered as a tool of theoretical exploration not confirmation‟. In this 
sense, the method does not go even as far as the method of induction implies in that 
there is no attempt to „verify‟ or „validate‟ inductively generated theory (from 
accumulation of similar observations) by the accumulation of further similar data. So 
what we have in this view is, simply, a method of generating ideas – in this case, ideas 
about patterns or groupings of data or of categories into which observations may be 
fitted. Dey quotes Gilovich „the predisposition to detect patterns and make connections 
is what leads to discovery and advance‟ (op cit: 175). But he does go further, saying that 
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„the particular merits of grounded theory...flow from grounding categories in data, even if 
this falls some way short of their full validation‟ (ibid).  
 
What constitutes grounding data seems surprisingly vexed given its centrality to the 
method. As Dey puts it: „One of the most striking but controversial recommendations of 
Glaser and Strauss was to avoid preconceptions and let categories “emerge” from the 
data. They thought preconceptions could be limited by not engaging in advance of the 
research with existing literature...‟ (op cit: 175-6). Hence the somewhat alarming practice 
noted earlier of not having a literature search before data collection in student project 
proposals. But Dey is not at one with this advice: „Pattern recognition...is only part of the 
process... We can think of identifying patterns as primarily a theoretical exercise if we 
consider patterns not as empirical regularities but as the underlying conceptualizations 
which can identify and describe...the empirical relationships‟ (op cit: 177). The fact that 
„pattern recognition‟ is itself problematical is left untouched here: it is the observer who 
creates the patterns – they are in this sense conjectural and therefore subject to test – 
by data. 
 
This issue of the relationship between emergent and existing theory and data has beset 
grounded theory. Kelle notes the debate between Glaser and Strauss and the somewhat 
different positions which they subsequently adopted (2010: 198-206).  
 
Strauss himself evidently recognised the problem in his later writings, arguing, according 
to Reichertz (2010: 215) that „theoretical pre-knowledge flows into the data‟s 
interpretation‟ whilst Glaser still „insists that the codes and categories emerge directly 
from the data‟. Reichertz argues that the later (Straussian) view of GT falls within the 
realm of „abductive‟ logic, an approach advocated by Charles S Peirce as categorically 
distinctive from both induction and deduction. Abduction is characterised as „a cognitive 
logic of discovery‟. In Reichertz‟s account it involves the assembly or discovery of a new 
explanation or rule when, „on the basis of an interpretation of collected data...there is no 
appropriate explanation or rule in the store of knowledge that already exists‟ (op cit: 
219). The new explanation must be reached by means of a mental process, „with the aid 
of intellectual effort‟. So abductive inference „is not therefore, a mode of reasoning that 
delivers new knowledge, and neither is it an exact method that assists in the generation 
of logically ordered hypotheses... or some new theory‟ (op cit: 221). It is „an attitude 
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towards data and...one‟s own knowledge: data are to be taken seriously and the validity 
of previously developed knowledge is to be queried‟ (ibid). 
 
It is not clear from this how abduction differs from the Popperian notion that knowledge 
advances by proposing tentative solutions (theories) to problems. What both induction 
and abduction seem to offer are ways of generating such tentative theories. Induction 
does this by seeking to „discover‟ patterns in data (as if they were actually there, rather 
than are constructs) and by painstaking procedure that seeks to emulate that believed to 
characterise some of the natural sciences. Abduction recognises that are theories are 
constructs and that imagination and creativity play an important part in their formulation. 
The patterns are not just there waiting to be discovered. So depending on which version 
of grounded theory is considered, it may or may not recognise that all observation and 
all theory formulation are informed  - consciously or otherwise - by preconceptions (that 
is by existing, perhaps unconscious, theory). Abduction, at least does so, but it still does 
not go far enough. 
 
For what is curious about grounded theory is the reluctance of nearly all of its 
proponents to countenance the crucial logical process of testing. Again, positions appear 
to differ on this, but the originators of the theory and most of the contributors in Bryant 
and Charmaz (2010) were and are, as already noted, clear that the method is only for 
generating theory. Although they are mostly inductivists, they do not go so far as to seek 
verification (not on the grounds that it is logically impossible to achieve this but because 
the method is not intended to go so far). Yet of what value is it then? As it stands in its 
conventional form, the method of grounded theory offers nothing more than a procedure 
for inventing ideas – generating theory, related to some topic currently under 
observation. Ideas can be invented in a multitude of ways - even sitting in the bath and 
thinking – and there is nothing in grounded theory that gives any logical reason to prefer 
its procedures as a basis for inventing  - and more importantly - for preference between 
competing theories. Grounded theory only offers a method for devising patterns in data. 
What makes theory of value is not the method used to generate it, but a subsequent 
stage, rejected by nearly all the advocates of grounded theory, of testing these theories.  
Timmermans and Tavary (2010) do suggest the use of Popper‟s principle of falsification. 
After a rather bowdlerised account of Popper‟s views, they propose that „falsification 
works as a continual and internal method aiding discovery and theory building...instead 
of being content with the formulation of ...theories, the researcher...attempts to actively 
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look for cases that might not fit the theory...‟ (2010: 501). It does seem astonishing that 
most protagonists of grounded theory cannot make this (modest) imaginative leap. The 
root of the problem lies in the insistence that grounded theory is inductive, and the 
refusal of most of its proponents to accept the long-established fallacy of induction. It is 
not grounded theory we need, but tested theory. 
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